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     Abstract  
 
This paper constructs the central bank independence and governance (CBIG) index for eight South 
Asian countries and examines their relationship with inflation. This CBIG index is constructed 
following the unique model developed by Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2006). This index 
consists of total 26 variables; all variables together form the overall index and different sub-sets of 
these variables construct sub-indices (eg. legal; political; price stability objectives; exchange rate 
policy; monetary policy and deficit financing; and accountability and transparency).   
 
Several countries have improved their CBIG in last fifteen years. The war torn Afghanistan 
have established a new central bank act in 2003 which has improved the standard of CBIG in the 
region. In recent time Nepal has made remarkable improvement in its ranking by allowing improved 
independence to its central bank. Bangladesh has taken lead in term of gradual CBIG improvement in 
last fifteen years. Sri Lanka, Indian and Pakistan are three countries always maintained a standard level 
of CBIG. Bhutan and Maldives showed less improvement among the countries. This paper also 
examines the statistical relationship between CBIG indices and inflation. The results indicate that there 
is a positive relationship between CBIG and inflation in the region which in contrary to normal 
expectation that inflation is one of the robust proxy of actual CBIG.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Central bank independence and governance (CBIG) has been sought by many countries as a 
way to improve their economic performance. Research on the relationship between central 
bank independence (CBI) and various macroeconomic variables (inflation, economic growth 
and per capita growth), however, have been mixed and confined largely to developed, 
transition and developing countries in Europe and the Americas. In contrast, the Asian or 
more specifically the South Asia has been neglected. So, our motivation is to address that gap 
in the literature. More specifically, we seek to test the relationship between inflation and 
CBIG by applying a comprehensive index developed by Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake 
(2008). This unique index has the advantage of not only investigating overall CBIG but also 
specific aspects of via its sub-indices.  
Our main contributions include conducting such a study for the first time in South 
Asia. The results indicate that there is a low positive relationship between inflation and CBIG. 
The study also finds that among the six sub-indices; only price stability objectives; 
accountability and transparency have a positive relationship whereas rest of the four sub-
indices were found as insignificant to inflation.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The literature review is presented 
in Section 2 while data and methodology is described in Section 3. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 2.0 Literature Review 
The CBIG literature takes two main approaches. First, it addresses the concept and definition 
of CBIG and then second, examines the relationship between CBIG and other macroeconomic 
variables. Both approaches develop or apply various CBI indices and definitions, but these 
tend to be inconsistent and often overlapping. This paper adopts the definitions and index-
model developed by Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008) as it addresses many 
previous CBI indices problems, such as, fewer variables1, overlaps2, governance3, 
                                                 
1  This suggests that the highest number of variables in any previous study was 16 (Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti 1992), whereas Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008) has 26 variables in their index. 
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subjectivity4 and the focus of the indices5. As our index is comprised of six sub-indices 
(CBIG (Legal), CBIG (Political), CBIG (Price stability objectives), CBIG (Exchange rate 
policy), CBIG (Monetary policy and deficit financing) and CBIG (Accountability and 
transparency), it may help identify specific differences in CBIG across countries and time. 
The remainder of this section discusses the relationship between inflation and CBIG literature 
in general, and then with each of the six CBIG sub-indices. Finally, the country specific 
overage of the prior works is discussed. 
Inflation is often used as a proxy of CBI mainly due to a central bank’s primary 
responsibility of price stability (Cukierman 2006) and that high CBIG is thought  to lower 
inflation (Panagiotidis and Triampella 2001). In other words, those economies with the 
highest inflation are those lacking CBI (Levy 2006). Though suitable in theory, the empirical 
findings on this relationship, as discussed below, are inconsistent.   
The CBIG (Legal) measures the legal strength of the central bank governor. If the 
governor can be changed easily, independence is unlikely (Moser and Dreher 2007). Indeed, a 
robust negative relationship between inflation and legal CBI is strongly supported (Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger 2001; Panagiotidis and 
Triampella 2006). Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) also detected 
a significant negative relationship between central bank legal independence and inflation in 
developed countries but not in developing ones. The impact of legal independence may then 
depend on the type of government in power. The strongest impact was found when a 
government was not open, overseas inflation high, the local financial sector small and wage 
                                                                                                                                            
2  This indicates to the use of some common variable(s) by different authors in their CBI indices. They may 
have named their indices differently however created an overlap due to use of common variables (Ahsan, 
Skully and Wickramanayake 2008).  
3  It refers to the absence of governance indicators in the previous indices as they focused on CBI only. But in 
this index Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008) have combined independence and governance 
indicators and named the index as CBIG. 
4  This specifies the robustness of the index constructed. There is a large proportion of subjective decision 
involved in and CBI index. Here Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008) measures content validity and 
reliability to identify the robustness of their indices.  
5  This CBIG index has six sub-indices and one overall index. The six sub-indices focus on six different aspects 
whereas the overall index measures the entire performance. 
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bargaining co-ordination low (Walsh 1997; Franzese 1999). Independence may also depend 
on economic liberalization.  Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002), for example, found no 
relation between CBI and inflation with countries in the early stage of liberalization in 1990s 
but that later the relationship was significant. From the above discussion a mixed relation 
between CBIG (Legal) and inflation is evident. 
   The CBIG (Political) measures the government interference in a central bank’s board. 
Where political influence is improperly managed, high-quality policymakers may be 
prematurely forced from office (Frisell, Roszbach and Spagnolo 2007). So, political stability 
or vulnerability is a crucial issue for independence. In other words, a central bank’s 
constitutional position is strengthened if it can protect itself from government interference 
(Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Frisell, Roszbach and Spagnolo 2007). With higher 
independence the possibility of election induced cycles in output and unemployment is 
greatly reduced (Clark, Reichert, Lomas and Parker 1998; Posen 1998). This finding is 
reinforced by both (Grier and Grier 2004; Dreher and Vaubel 2005) who emphasises that 
independence is a buffer against political interference. The political vulnerability of central 
bank may have a significant positive impact on inflation (Cukierman and Webb 1995); 
meaning that political stability would reduce the inflation. Therefore higher CBIG via  
political checks and balances can reduce inflation (de Haan and Kooi 1997; Keefer and 
Stasavage 2001).  
The CBIG (Price stability objectives) focuses on the central bank independence in 
pursuing price stability as its main objective. Price stability means that the monetary policy is 
geared to maintain a constant price level or a low rate of inflation (Cukierman 1996) and has 
been viewed as the best way for a central bank to contribute sustainable economic growth and 
financial stability (Bade and Parkin 1988). However, completing objectives, such as 
economic development, addressing unemployment and executing government’s economic 
policies, cannot be the key central bank objectives, although some may be partly a central 
bank responsibility. For successful price stability a central bank should have sufficient power 
to set inflation targets and interest rate policy; as timely and modest interest responses to 
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inflation surprises can contribute to long-run financial stability (Sinclair 2000). CBIG is 
considered a precondition to achieve these price stability objectives and several researchers 
have found evidence of their robust negative relationship between CBIG and inflation (Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Alesina and Summers 1993; Loungani and Sheets 1997; 
Iversen 1998; de Haan and Kooi 2000). Conversely, others argue that the relationship depends 
on the indicators applied (Eijffinger, Van Rooij and Schaling 1997) or only mattered during 
disinflation (Jordan 1997).  
 The CBIG (Exchange rate policy) measures central bank independence in foreign 
exchange rate policy. Theoretically no intervention is needed; if a currency market is freely 
floating. In extreme situations, however, central banks will intervene to stabilize the currency. 
The issue here is therefore whether the central bank intervenes on its own or at the direction 
of government: government interventions in the foreign exchange market would affect CBI  
(Fry, Goodhart and Almeida 1996; Baines 2001; Grier and Grier 2004). Government 
intervention may seek to favor some interest groups (Frieden 1991). Setzer (2004) argues that 
this depends mostly on the political color of the government in power and the degree of 
central bank independence. Some politically controlled central banks will even reduce their 
foreign exchange reserves at election times to mitigate the exchange rate effects of 
expansionary monetary policies, and replenish them thereafter (Dreher and Vaubel 2005). An 
exchange rate regime (fixed or flexible) also affects inflation differently as the stable 
exchange rate coupled with higher central bank independence produces lower inflation 
(Kuttner and Posen 2001; Ja'come and Va'zquez 2005). 
 The CBIG (Monetary policy and deficit financing) refers to the central bank’s power 
in monetary policy formulation and avoiding the financing of the government’s budget. 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1992; 1993a) conclude that incomplete policy authority (or twin 
authority) makes  a central bank less independent whereas higher CBI would help to maintain 
monetary targets (Arnone, Laurens, Segalotto and Sommer 2007). Consequently, the greater 
the government influence on financing of the budget deficit, the smaller a central bank’s 
economic independence (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991). In contrast, Bade and 
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Parkin (1988) and Alesina (1989) found no association between monetary policy and CBI. 
The CBIG depends on the central bank’s ability and freedom to formulate and implement its 
policies (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Eijffinger and Schaling 1993b). The cost of 
government intervention in monetary policy is substantial (Cobham, Papadopoulos and Zis 
2004). Countries with central banks, independent both in policymaking and appointing 
directors, exhibit lower inflation (Bade and Parkin 1988). CBI is found to be strongly related 
to inflation (de Haan and Kooi 2000), but  inflation may also be affected by monetary 
conservatism, unemployment and wage bargaining (Iversen 1998).  
 The CBIG (Accountability and transparency) refers to certain policy objectives being 
achieved and the quality and detail of their disclosures. It also may be defined as the degree of 
public understanding about monetary policy processes and decisions. Transparency has 
become a major issue nowadays (de Haan and Amtenbrink 2003). Likewise, democratic 
accountability is also an issue as a central bank run by non-elected members should be at least 
accountable to the elected parliament (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 2002). Credibility is an 
integral part of accountability and transparency (Lybek 2004). It is considered to be important 
to attain price stability at a low cost, while the best way to earn credibility is through a history 
of honesty and a high level of CBI. The increase in CBI and handing over power to non-
elected officials may reduce the credibility6 problem but this can become more problematic in 
times of large unexpected economic shocks (Cukierman 1994). The credibility to manage 
monetary policy increases when the inflation is successfully kept low (Keefer and Stasavage 
1998). Therefore, the literature considers low inflation as an effective tool to measure 
credibility. Accountability and transparency are generally considered conducive to 
independence (Amtenbrink 2004; Lybek 2004), as well as important components of monetary 
policy framework (Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne 2000). Higher CBI facilitates 
                                                 
6  In academic literature, central bank credibility is often identified with one of three things: strong 
aversion to inflation, incentive compatibility, or pre-commitment (Blinder 2000). Others have defined 
it as -a central bank is not credible unless it is bound by some kind of "commitment technology" to live 
up to its word. Indeed, the inability to commit to a policy of low inflation is often seen as seriously 
undermining both central bank credibility and performance. It is often said to be the main reason why 
central banks allow too much inflation (Barro and Gordon 1983). 
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greater policy transparency and political coherence (Hallett and Weymark 2005). It also leads 
to an expectation of lower inflation and less stabilization of supply shock (Eijffinger and 
Hoeberichts 2002), and a more stable exchange rate and lower inflation (Kuttner and Posen 
2001). Some studies, however, have found a negative relationship between CBI and 
accountability (de Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger 1999). Perhaps this reflects a trade-off 
between full transparency and full utilization of information by central bank, as excessive 
transparency may inject political influences into monetary policy (Cukierman 2007). 
As the above discussion shows, the relationship between inflation and different 
aspects of CBIG may vary over time and by country. Previous studies have covered mostly 
developed, developing and transition economies (see Table 1) in Latin America, North 
America and Europe. The Asian countries, particularly the South Asian ones were totally 
ignored. As individual country characteristics, particularly differing economic development 
levels may cause variations in CBIG.  The characteristics of South Asian countries also differ 
within the region (see Table 2). These low-income counties also may differ from Europe and 
America in their relationships between CBIG and inflation.  
3.0 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data: This study covers eight countries from South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The primary sources of data for 
CBIG index are the individual central bank7 acts (includes amendments, circulars, media 
releases and other central bank publications) over 1991-2005 from the eight countries of 
South Asia. Some data were collected from Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, and 
some directly contacting specific central banks. The inflation data were sourced from the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank and World Economic Outlook of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
3.2 Research Design: The main components of research design include: the CBIG index 
construction; CBIG ranking; the statistical relationship between CBIG and inflation; and 
                                                 
7    The sample includes four monetary authorities (MA): (Bhutan, Hong Kong-SAR, Maldives and Macao-
SAR). For simplicity of analysis they are given of equal status as a central bank in the main study but 
separate tests for CBs and MAs are provided in the columns 2 and 3 of Table 11. 
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finally, the diagnostic, specification and robustness checks of the techniques applied. The 
least square method was applied to test the relationship of the study. 
3.2.1 Index Construction: The CBIG indices are constructed following Ahsan, Skully and 
Wickramanayake (2008) index-model. The detailed index construction procedure is shown in 
Table 3. The main equation to calculate CBIG overall index is explained by equation (1). This 
overall CBIG index (CBIGOverall) in constructed with the six sub-indices (CBIGLeg, CBIGPol, 
CBIGPStab, CBIGForx, CBIGMonPol, CBIGAccTrans).  
CBIGOverall =  w1CBIGLeg + w2CBIGPol + w3CBIGPStab + w4CBIGForx 
+w5CBIGMonPol + w6CBIGAccTrans (1) 
Where, 
CBIGLeg =  Legal Index of CBIG  
CBIGPol =  Political Index of CBIG  
CBIGPStab =  Price Stability Objectives Index of CBIG 
CBIGForx =  Exchange Rate Policy Index of CBIG  
CBIGMonPol =  Monetary Policy and Deficit Financing Index of CBIG 
CBIGAccTrans = Accountability and Transparency Index of CBIG 
Weight=  w1= 5/26; w 2=3/26; w3=3/26; w4=3/26; w5=6/26; w6= 6/26. 
The variables are equally weighted8 to construct the sub-indices and the overall 
index. The proportional weights of the sub-indices in the overall index reflect the actual 
number of variables in each, divided by the total number of variables (26)9. Differing weights 
might have been used but factor analysis failed to identify any meaningful relative weighting. 
So they were set as equal to avoid any subjective decision.   
                                                
3.2.2 Diagnostics, Specifications and Robustness Analysis:  This section explains our 
diagnostic, specification and robustness tests. 
 
8    The alternative outcome of each variable in the index was weighted from highest to lowest contribution 
towards CBIG in a Likert scale 0 to 1.  
9    The number of variables in the sub-indices are: five in legal; three in political; three in price stability 
objectives; three in exchange rate policy; six in monetary policy and deficit financing; and finally six in 
accountability and transparency indices. 
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The diagnostics tests include stationarity10 check by Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test; multi-collinearity was avoided by keeping highly correlated variables in separate 
models. Hetroskedasticity is addressed by applying robust standard error method. So the 
covariance matrix is corrected via the  White’s (1980) correction test. The annual inflation (π) 
figures were converted to transformed inflation11 (YD) to ameliorate potential 
hetroskedasticity problem (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; de Haan and Kooi 2000; 
Ja'come and Va'zquez 2005); finally, autocorrelation among the error terms were examined 
by the Wooldridge (2002) test. 
The robustness of the CBIG index is as important as the robustness of the statistical 
techniques. The central difficulty is measuring CBIG in different countries (Alesina and 
Summers 1993). The elements that determine independence are difficult to quantify (Alesina 
1988) and there may be unavoidably subjective or arbitrary decisions involved in the coding, 
classifying, and weighting legal information (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992). The most 
common approaches often seek to measure relative degrees of independence by comparing 
the legal statutes covering the central banks. However, even this narrowing of characteristics 
leaves many awkward judgments to be made (Forder 1999). Content validity and reliability 
have been used to address subjectivity (Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake 2008).  
The former (also known as logical validity) refers to the extent a measure represents 
all facets of a given concept. One of the widely used methods of Lawshe (1975) for gauging 
agreement among experts regarding essentiality of a particular item (see Table 5), calculated 
by following equation (2).  
2
2
N
Nn
CVR
e ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
=                                                                                             (2) 
       Where, CVR = Content validity ratio, ne = Number of panellist indicating “essential”, N = 
                                                 
10    Stationarity is used as a tool in time series analysis (Gujarati 2003); this paper uses panel data, however 
the stationarity check has been done for both CBIG index values and other variables as a robustness 
check. 
11    Transformed inflation ( )π
π
+= 1DY
. 
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Total number of panellist. 
     The reliability tests applied here include test of stability (test-retest) and internal 
consistency (Cronbach alpha). The test of stability (test-retest) determines the reliability in 
measuring the same thing repeatedly under the same conditions and then calculating the 
variability of the resulting measures (see Table 6) applying following equation (3).  
( )
( )1
2
Testscore
TestscoreretestTest =−                                                                                 (3) 
The test-retest method is applied to measure the reliability of sub-indices only while 
the test of internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) is applied to the overall index (see Table 6) 
because the value of alpha varies with changes in the number of items. It also means that the 
alpha levels comparison between scales with differing numbers of items is not appropriate 
(Santos 1999). The number of items of CBIG sub-indices is very small and also has varying 
numbers of items across six sub-indices. So, Cronbach alpha is not applied for sub-indices but 
only to overall index using the following equation (4).  
α = ( )
( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∑−
− x
Y
N
N i
2
21
1 σ
σ                                                                                (4) 
    Where, N = The number of items, ( )iY2σ∑ = The sum of item variance,  =The variance 
of the total composite. 
x2σ
These validity and reliability measures address subjectivity but it still requires logical 
and careful estimation to keep them at a manageable level.  
3.2.4 CBIG and Inflation Relationship: The relationship between CBIG (overall and sub-
indices) and inflation (YDtk) is tested by equations (5-11) shown below. Equation (5) 
examines the main relationship between inflation (YDtk) and overall CBIG (CBIGOveralltk). 
The other six equations (6-11) test  the relationship between inflation (YDtk) and each CBIG 
sub-index separately after controlling for real interest rate (REALINTRATEtk), money 
supply (M2PERGDPtk), Asian financial crisis dummy (ASCRIS1997tk), Sri lanka_Dummy 
(Sri Lanka_Dummytk) and Maldives_Dummy (Mal_Dummytk). The evidence of control 
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variables found in previous CBIG literature. The proxy of CBI was controlled by three decade 
dummies by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). Inflation may also be controlled by bank 
crisis dummy and a proxy for international inflation (Ja'come and Va'zquez 2005). 
  The main relationship (Overall CBIG and inflation) 
YDtk = βo + β1 CBIGOveralltk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
           + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
(5)
The Associated relationship (Sub-index CBIG and inflation)  
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGLegtk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
             + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
(6)
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGPoltk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
               + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
(7)
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGPStabtk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
                + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
  (8)
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGForxtk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
                 + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
(9)
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGMonPoltk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
                 + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
(10)
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGAccTrnstk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk  
                 + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk 
 
(11)
 
4. 0  Empirical Results: CBIG and Inflation (1991 – 2005) 
Our empirical results on CBIG and inflation are discussed in three parts: the CBIG index 
ranking in Section 4.1; and finally, the statistical relation between CBIG and inflation in 
Section 4.2.  
4.1 CBIG Index rankings: Several countries have improved their CBIG in last 15 years. The 
war torn Afghanistan have established a new central bank act in 2003 which has improved the 
standard of CBIG in the region. In recent time Nepal has made remarkable improvement in its 
ranking by allowing improved independence to its central bank. Bangladesh has taken lead in 
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term of gradual CBIG improvement in last fifteen years. Sri Lanka, Indian and Pakistan are 
three countries always maintained a standard level of CBIG. Bhutan and Maldives showed 
less improvement among the countries. 
4.2 Statistical Relationship between CBIG and Inflation: The main finding is that an 
increase in CBIG is associated with a very low significant increase in inflation (YD) in the 
South Pacific (see column 2 Table 7). This positive relationship is not unexpected, the 
previous studies have shown that in developing countries the CBIG may not (Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapti 1992). The main equation (5) indicates this is significant at 10% level12. 
This is similar to the finding of several authors (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger 2001; Panagiotidis and 
Triampella 2006), but not all studies, have proved so supportive. Others have found a weak or 
even no relationship (Posen 1995; Fujiki 1996).  
 The Asian financial crisis dummy is insignificant; indicating the CBIG before the 
crisis is not significantly different than CBIG after the crisis. The country dummy for Sri 
Lanka is insignificant but it is significant for Maldives. Sri Lanka and Maldives are the only 
two low-middle income countries in the sample. The CBIG in Maldives is significantly 
different from rest of the seven countries in the region. The money supply has low level 
significant relationship, it may indicate that when the CBIG increases then the central banks 
apply more control tools to manage money supply with the view to restrict inflation. There   
was no relationship found between CBIG and real interest rate. The adjusted R square of the 
overall test is 20.88% and the value of F Statistics is very highly significant indicating to the 
overall strength of the test conducted.  
The test results between CBIG sub-indices and inflation are very mixed. The legal; 
political; exchange rate policy; monetary policy and deficit financing are all insignificant; 
however the price stability objectives; accountability and transparency have significant 
                                                 
12     CBIG and inflation was also tested through three refined samples (countries with central banks only; 
ones with monetary authorities only; and countries with inflation targeting) as shown in columns 2, 3 
and 4 of Table 11. The findings of central bank only sample (column 2) and inflation targeting samples 
(column 4) supports the main view of a negative relationship between CBIG and inflation.   
12 
 
positive relationship with inflation. So, increase in CBIG (price stability objectives) and 
CBIG (accountability and transparency) associate with increase in inflation in the region. The 
country dummy for Maldives is significant in all equations. The variable indicating money 
supply is significant in price stability objectives and accountability and transparency 
equations. The adjusted R square for each test is around 20%. 
 
5.0  Conclusion 
This paper examined the relationship between CBIG indices and inflation for eight South 
Asia Pacific countries. It used these indices to rank each country and, then applied a pooled 
regression model to test the relationship between these CBIG (Overall and sub-indices) 
indices and inflation.   
The main statistical findings include a low positive relationship between CBIG 
indices and inflation after controlling for other variables. The CBIG sub-indices were tested 
but were statistically insignificant except price stability objectives; accountability and 
transparency. Other findings include that one of the two low-middle income countries, 
Maldives has significantly different CBIG compared to rest of the seven countries in the 
region.  The Asian financial crisis dummy was found as insignificant.  
This study provides several contributions to the central bank independence and 
governance literature. The key one is its establishment of a relationship between CBIG and 
inflation in the South Asia. Inflation is an important monetary policy tool and there are policy 
implications in identifying its correct relationship.  
Finally, it is the first study of this kind examining this relationship on South Asian 
countries. So this adds to the CBIG literature in this respect as does the dataset utilised (1991–
2005). 
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Table 1 Sample of Selected Previous Studies 
Author(s) Sample countries 
Alesina and Sachs (1988)Alesina (1989) 10 European Countries And New Zealand 
Bade and Parkin (1988) 10 European Countries And New Zealand 
Baines (2001) 12 Industrialised Countries 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti  (1992) 72 Countries Both Developing And Industrial 
Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb 
(1993) 
70 Countries, Both LDC And Industrial 
Cukierman (1993) 67 Industrial And Developing Countries  
Cukierman and Webb (1995) 67 Industrial And Developing Countries  
de Haan and Van ‘T Hag (1994) OECD Countries 
de Souza   (2002) Accession Countries Of Europe And The Baltic Region 
de Haan and  Amtenbrink (2003) ECB And 5 Other Developed Countries.  
de Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1999) 16 Central Banks 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a) 12 Industrial Countries 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993b) 10 European Countries And New Zealand 
Eijffinger and Hoebrichts (2002) 5 Key Central Banks 
Fry (1996) Asia Pacific Countries 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini  (1991) 18 OECD Countries 
Grier and Grier (2004) 9 Latin American Countries 
Kuttner and Posen (2001) 41 Countries OECD, Latin America, East Asia  
Neyapti (2003) 54 Developed And Less Developed Countries 
Sinclair (2000) Total 37 (13 Industrial, 16 Developing And 8 
Transition) Central Banks 
Sterne (1999) 91 Central Banks (Developed And Developing) 
     Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Table 2 The Sample 
 Country Year 
Estab 
Central Bank’s Name Land 
area (sq. 
km) 
Population 
(total) 
Country 
Type 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
South Asia      
1 Afghanistan 1939 Da Afghanistan Bank 652,090 31,889,923 LI 
2 Bangladesh 1971 Bangladesh Bank 130,170 141,822,276 LI 
3 Bhutan‡ 1982 Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan 47,000 636,638 LI 
4 India 1934 Reserve Bank of India 2,973,190 1,094,583,000 LI 
5 Maldives‡ 1981 Maldives Monetary Authority 300 329,198 LM 
6 Nepal 1956 Nepal Rastra Bank 143,000 27,132,629 LI 
7 Pakistan 1956 State Bank of Pakistan 770,880 155,772,000 LI 
8 Sri Lanka 1949 Central Bank of Sri Lanka 64,630 19,625,384 LM 
Notes: LI=Low income, LM=Low middle income, ‡Monetary Authority (MA). 
Source: Author’s compilation from different sources, such as World Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Economic Outlook, CIA World Fact Book, and central bank web sites 
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Table: 3 CBIG Index Format 
1. LEGAL (CBIGLeg) Coding 
a. Term of office of Governor / CEO (TOG)  
7 years or more 1.00 
6 years 0.80 
5 years 0.60 
4 years 0.40 
Below 4 years 0.20 
Not Mentioned 0.00 
The longer the appointment, the higher the score. 7 years was set as the longest appointment as no 
Governor/CEO has been found to be appointed of more than 7 years. The score reduces gradually with 
fewer years. Any value less than 4 years is usually less than the term of the government so gets equal 
score. The lowest score is assigned if the term is not mentioned even if there is a practice to appoint for 
a certain number of years. When the Act makes no mention of term of appointments then legally it 
becomes very weak and receives a zero score. When the term is not a specific number of year (e.g. 4) 
rather a range of years (e.g. 4 to 6 years), then the average of the range used (e.g. 4+6=10/2=5).  
b. Legal power to appoint Governor/ CEO (LPA)  
Board of the central bank 1.00 
Parliament/Legislature 0.67 
Government but need parliament consent 0.33 
Government/ Executives alone 0.00 
A Governor/CEO appointed by the central bank’s board is considered the most independent 
appointment. The Governor/CEO can be appointed solely by a parliament/parliamentary committee 
without any involvement of the government.  When the government appoints/selects but still needs 
approval or at least has to inform the parliament, then it is considered better than government appointing 
the Governor/CEO alone.    
c. Legal power to Dismiss Governor/ CEO (LPD)  
No provision for dismissal 1.00 
Board of the central bank 0.67 
Parliament/Legislature or Government but approved by the parliament  0.33 
Government/ Executives alone 0.00 
Where the Act precludes the Governor/CEO from being terminated or only for physical and mental 
disability then highest score assigned. The next best is the power rest with board of the central bank, 
then the power is with the parliament or at least require parliament’s approval. The lowest score is 
where the government can act alone.  
d. Reappointment of Governor/ CEO (RAG)  
Yes, there is provision of reappointment 1.00 
Not mentioned  0.50 
No, provision 0.00 
If it is mentioned in the law that it permits reappointment then scores highest and lowest for having no 
provision. Not mentioning anything is considered better than no provision as the Governor/CEO still 
could be reappointed in this case whereas it is not possible at all when  the provision is bared.  
e. Regulatory and supervisory power of central bank (RSC)  
Yes, completely separated 1.00 
Jointly done by central bank and other authorities  0.50 
No, only by central bank 0.00 
A completely separated authority receives highest score, central banks managing jointly with others 
scores better than central banks doing it alone.  
CBIGLeg =  w1TOG + w2LPA + w3LPD + w4RAG + w5RSC 
Where, w1= w2= w3= w4= w5 
2. POLITICAL (CBIGPol) Coding 
a. Turnover of Governor/CEO (TRG)  
Governor/CEO changed after 1 year or more of government’s change  1.00 
Governor/CEO within 1 year of government’s change 0.50 
Governor/CEO within 6 months of government’s change 0.00 
Governor/CEO changed after one years or more time since a new government takes over the power 
scores highest, changed within one year ranked second and changed within six months is the worst 
example of political influence getting lowest score.  
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b. Members of the management board of central bank (CMB)  
Non-government persons  1.00 
Not mentioned government or non-government persons 0.67 
Government employees 0.33 
Government ministers  0.00 
When the members of the board comes from non-government sources like business and academics then 
they are assigned highest score. Where government or non-government positions are not mentioned it is 
still considered better than having mentioned about government employees or ministers. Between 
government employees and ministers, ministers are assigned lower score as they are more powerful in 
implementing the government’s agenda.  
c. Governor/CEO holds other office in the government (GOO)  
No, Governor/CEO does not  1.00 
Yes, but with prior permission from government  0.50 
Yes, always  0.00 
It scores highest when the Governor/CEO does not hold any other position within the government. If the 
Governor/CEO holds a position with the prior permission of the government, it is assigned better score 
than the Governor/CEO is an ex officio government employee.  
CBIGPol =  w6TRG + w7CMB + w8GOO 
Where, w6= w7= w8.  
3. PRICE STABILITY OBJECTIVES (CBIGPStab) Coding 
a. The major objectives of the central bank (MOB)  
Price stability as the only objective of the bank 1.00 
Price stability is one objective with other compatible objectives 0.67 
No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.33 
Stated objectives do not include price stability 0.00 
Highest score assigned when the central bank has only one objective of price stability. The second 
highest score assigned when price stability is one of the objectives among other compatible objectives. 
If there is no objectives mentioned in the bank charter it is considered better than the situation of not 
including price stability among stated objectives, because not including price stability means totally 
ignoring price stability, whereas it may be an administrative flaws not to include any objectives in the 
charter, while they still may some objectives in place.  
b. Inflation targeting (INT)  
Independently by central bank 1.00 
Jointly with government  0.50 
Not done by the central bank 0.00 
It gets highest score when the inflation targeting is done by central bank alone. When the targeting is 
done by central bank and government jointly through a coordination council then second highest score 
has been assigned. If it is not done by the central bank rather done by the government alone then the 
score allocated is lowest at zero. 
c. Interest rate controlling (INC)  
Independently by central bank 1.00 
Jointly with government 0.50 
Not done by the central bank 0.00 
When the interest rate is controlled by the market or by the central bank without direct or indirect order 
from government then it receives highest score. If done jointly by the government and central bank, it is 
assigned second highest score. The lowest score is if the government does so alone.  
CBIGPStab =  w9MOB + w10INT + w11INC 
Where, w9= w10= w11 
4. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (CBIGForx) Coding 
a. Foreign exchange market interventions  (FIN)  
By central Bank alone  1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government only 0.00 
Under a fixed, pegged and managed floating exchange rate system, the currency rate needs to be 
stabilized regularly, if the central bank can take action on its own without receiving any directives from 
the central bank then highest score is allocated. When the central bank and government manages the 
exchange rate through a coordination council then it is considered medium CBIG and none when the 
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central bank does not have any say it just have to act upon the order of the government. If the law does 
not mention that who should intervene the market then it is assumed about the government as it is 
expected that if responsibilities were given to the central bank that would have been included in the law.  
b. Foreign exchange market regulations (FMR)  
By central bank alone 1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government only 0.00 
The power to formulate exchange rate policy regulations by central bank gives it complete independence 
to manage the currency market so the highest score is allotted for this category. Regulations formulated 
jointly is considered second best option and regulations formulated by the government only is less 
desired in terms of CBIG and allotted lowest score zero.  When the law does not mention that who 
should regulate the market then it is assumed that the government does so alone.  
c. Foreign exchange borrowings (FBR)  
Central bank has a prominent role   1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government alone 0.00 
When central bank has a prominent role in deciding foreign currency borrowing, it is deemed the most 
beneficial for CBIG and ranked highest. Joint operation is regarded the next best option, whereas, 
decisions taken only by government receives a zero. While the law does not mention who decides about 
borrowing then it is assumed about the government does so alone.   
CBIGForx =  w12FIN + w13FMR + w14FBR 
Where, w12= w13= w14 
5. MONETARY POLICY AND DEFICIT FINANCING (CBIGMonPol) Coding 
a. Responsibility of monetary policy formulation (MPF)  
Central bank alone 1.00 
Central bank participates, but has little influence 0.67 
Central bank only advice government 0.33 
Central bank has no say 0.00 
The responsibility of monetary policy formulation without any direction or influence from any quarter 
enhances the CBIG and so allotted highest score. A central bank which may participate in policy 
formulation but has little influence over a coordination council headed by government representative or 
minister then ranked as second category of CBIG. An instance, where the government only takes advice 
from the central bank but formulate its own monetary policy by its staffs in the ministries then it is 
ranked as third best category. Subsequently if the central bank has so say at all or wholly done by 
government ministries without any role of central bank then it is deemed to lowest rank of CBIG.  
b. The final word in resolution of conflict (FWC)  
The central bank, clearly defined in the law 1.00 
 A council of the central bank, executive branch, and legislative branch 0.50 
Government and Executive branch 0.00 
The final word in the matter of monetary policy should be held by central bank as it ensures highest 
CBIG. If the difference is resolved in a council of central bankers and executives then it reduces the 
status of CBIG. When government retains the power to make final decision or such matters are referred 
to President, Governor General, Prime Minister, Finance Minster or any  such authority then it is ranked 
lowest as there is no CBIG. 
c. Lending to the government (PLN)  
I. Provision for lending  
Not permitted  1.00 
Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue) 0.67 
Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15% of government revenue) 0.33 
No legal limits on lending 0.00 
In a country when a law/act has been passed that government cannot borrow from the central bank then 
it is allotted highest scores in all four categories. When lending is permitted then ranking has been done 
for each category separately. For a central bank where lending to the government is permitted, first the 
limit of lending is measured in terms of proportion to the government revenue. If it is below fifteen per 
cent of government revenue then the score assigned is 0.67 as highest score is meant to be for the central 
bank which is not allowed to lend. When the limit exceeds fifteen per cent then 0.33 score is put. The 
worst case scenario is when there is no legal limit on lending. 
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II. Terms of lending (TRL)  
Controlled by the central bank 1.00 
Specified by the central bank charter 0.67 
Agreed between the central bank and executive 0.33 
Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00 
In the cases where lending is allowed, the terms and conditions of lending should be controlled by the 
central bank alone. This option is considered better than terms specified by the bank charter as under 
this option central bank can update the terms and conditions depending on the market condition. 
Moreover, central bank charters cannot be amended every year. So once a terms and condition is written 
in the charter it might have to be updated at different times. However, terms and conditions specified by 
the charter also not a weak option and considered better than agreed between central bank and executive 
branch, where it is possible that executive branch may get away with easy terms by influencing the 
central bank authority. The weakest form is when the all terms are made by executive branch alone. 
When there is nothing mentioned about terms and conditions in the Act then it is assumed that 
everything is decided by the executive branch as if there was any intention to give control to the central 
bank then it would have been mentioned in the Act.  
III. Maturity of loans (MLN)  
Within 6 months 1.00 
Within 1 year 0.67 
More than 1 year 0.33 
Not mentioned in the law 0.00 
Shorter the maturity better for CBIG. It is recommended that the borrowing should be may only for six 
months. This option is assigned highest CBIG score, followed by within one year’s option and more 
than one year’s option. If the maturity is not mentioned in the law then it is considered zero CBIG.  
IV. Interest rates on loan  (INL)  
At market rates or above minimum rate 1.00 
Below market rate 0.67 
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.33 
No interest on government borrowing  0.00 
When government borrows at a competitive rate of market rate or at the refinancing rate or above the 
minimum rate then it is delegated highest CBIG score. Below market rate is the next option of setting 
interest rate on loans. No mention of interest rate is considered better than no interest rate on 
government borrowing as under the former category the central bank still may change interest but in 
case of former here is no scope of doing it.  
CBIGMonPol = w15MPF + w16FWC + w17PLN+ w18TRL + w19MLN + w20INL 
Where, w15= w16= w17= w18= w19 = w20
6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (CBIGAcctrans) Coding 
a. Objectives of the central bank (WOB)  
I. Written objectives  
Mentioned in the law 1.00 
Not mentioned in the law but evident in other documents 0.50 
Not mentioned 0.00 
Objectives mentioned in the Act are considered best in terms of transparency. If the objectives are not 
mentioned in the law but evident is other documents still carries some amount of transparency compared 
to not mentioning it at all. Some central banks have mentioned about having missions/goals/functions 
instead of objectives. Practically though they are different from each other but here when a central bank 
does not have any objectives but their mission statement/goals/functions are written in such a way that it 
has very similarity with a objective statement then those statement are considered equivalent of 
objectives and assigned marks for them.  
II. Clear priorities in objectives (COB)  
Priorities are distinct and easy to understand 1.00 
Priorities are there, but not distinctly presented 0.50 
No priorities 0.00 
When the specific section of law or any form of statement of objectives mentions the priorities of 
objectives then it is considered best among the options mentioned above. The following category means 
when the priorities are evident from the activities of the central bank or from the speeches of 
Governor/CEO or any other research documents of central bank. Having no proprieties in objectives 
brings no transparencies for central bank.  
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b. Communication strategy  
I. Policy explanations provided for public (PEP)  
Regularly communicated to public 1.00 
Occasionally communicated to public 0.50 
Not communicated at all 0.00 
Regularly communicated to public means that there are set times in a year to publicly disclose policies 
of central bank. Occasionally means that there is no set time to organize policy briefing or there is no 
public briefing at all but policies are communicated through speeches of Governor/CEO or by 
publishing research papers on different occasions. The above two option are top two categories in CBIG 
ranking followed by lowest score of not communicating at all.  
II. Publication of minutes of Board meeting (PMN)  
Minutes are published publicly 1.00 
Minutes are kept but not published 0.50 
Nothing mentioned 0.00 
When the central bank board’s meeting minutes are published for public then it is ranked at the top, 
followed by keeping the minutes but not publishing them. Subsequently lowest score assigned for not 
mentioning anything about meeting minutes at all.  
c. Accountability of the Governor/ CEO (ACG)  
 Board of central bank 1.00 
 Parliament 0.67 
Parliament and government  0.33 
Government only 0.00 
A board of central bank is considered independent of any influences, so a Governor/CEO accountable to 
the board is also assumed as best option of accountability and allotted highest score. The second 
category indicates the Governor/CEO presents its report to the standing committee or directly to the 
session of parliament. When the Governor/CEO has to present report to both government and parliament 
or the Governor/CEO presents its report to the Government and the report is also placed to the 
parliament then they belong to the third category of accountability. If the Governor/CEO is accountable 
to the government then it is considered not favorable to CBIG at all rather it will give the government 
the opportunity to influence central banks activities.  
d. Audit of central bank (ADC)  
 External auditor 1.00 
Internal auditor 0.50 
Nothing mentioned 0.00 
When independent professional auditors or government Auditor General of the country are appointed 
then it is considered external auditors. If the law says the auditors are appointed by the board of the 
central bank or by country’s head of state then it is also assumed that the auditors are external. If the 
audit committee of the central bank or anyone appointed from the current employees of the central bank 
or from the government then they are assumed internal auditor and ranked lower than external auditor as 
internal auditor’s report provide biased report because of its attachments to the central bank or to the 
government.  
 CBIGAccTrans = w21WOB + w22COB + w23PEP + w24PMN + w25ACG + w26ADC 
Where, w21= w22= w23= w24= w25= w26.
CBIGOverall =  w1CBIGLeg + w2CBIGPol + w3CBIGPStab + w4CBIGForx +w5CBIGMonPol + 
w6CBIGAccTrans 
Where, w1= 5/26; w 2=3/26; w3=3/26; w4=3/26; w5=6/26; w6= 6/26.
Notes:  Assigning scores for each variable are based on the written Act, amendments or any other 
form of written documents. In some cases, where there were not enough information available or a 
specific term is explained in a different way than conventional approach or a particular information is 
very unique for a central bank and does not fall into our Index format then few assumptions had been 
made to complete the scoring or some modification have been made to complete the scoring. For 
example, A Governor/CEO is accountable to both central bank board (1.00) and government (0.00), but 
there is no such category (Board and Government) in this index. Whilst this information is very unique 
to a specific central bank. So, the average of two score has been used to decide score for that category. 
Most of the assumptions are explained under each variable while explaining the calculation of scores.  
Source: Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008). 
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Table 4 CBIG (Overall) Ranking, South Asia, 1991-2005* 
Country Data  
Availability 
Average  
CBIG  
Year  
2005 
Year   
1991-92 
Average  
CBIG Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Afghanistan 2003-2005 0.7496 (1) 0.7496 (1) - 0.0000 (7) 
Nepal 2002-2005 0.6972 (2) 0.6972 (2) - 0.0000 (7) 
Sri Lanka 1991-2005 0.6510 (3) 0.6714 (3) 0.6436 (1) 0.0031 (5) 
India 1991-2005 0.6333 (4) 0.6378 (4) 0.6044 (2) 0.0042 (4) 
Pakistan 1991-2005 0.4947 (5) 0.5169 (5) 0.4892 (3) 0.0056 (3) 
Bhutan 1991-2005 0.4014 (6) 0.4100 (7) 0.4008 (4) 0.0016 (6) 
Bangladesh 1991-2005 0.3589 (7) 0.4958 (6) 0.3125 (5) 0.0440 (1) 
Maldives 1991-2005 0.2593 (8) 0.2667 (8) 0.2389 (6) 0.0083 (2) 
*Few countries have data for shorter period, see column two of this Table 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
Table 5 Content Validity Ratio (CVR) for CBIG Indices 
This table reports the content validity ratios (CVR) of the CBIG indices.  It collects the CBIG expert’s 
opinions (various delegates, formal discussants, session chairs and conference judges) in column two 
and three. Agreed as “essential” (ne) calculates the number of experts fully agree about all 26 variables 
of the index (column 2). Partially agreed means few scholars had some suggestions for shifting a 
particular variable to another sub-indices but not disagreeing its essentiality in the CBIG index (column 
3). Total (N) defines the total number of experts considered for this analysis. CVR is calculated by   
 
 (2) 
 
 
 applying Lawshe’s (1975) formula (equation 2) presented in section 
3.2.3. The main finding includes a very high level of content validity 
for all CBIG indices. 
CBIG  indices Agreed as “essential”(ne) Partially agreed Total (N) CVR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBIGLeg 56 9 65 0.73 
CBIGPol  56 7 63 0.77 
CBIGPStab 56 2 58 0.93 
CBIGForx 56 3 59 0.90 
CBIGMonPol 56 2 58 0.93 
CBIGAccTrns 56 2 58 0.93 
CBIGOverall 56 9 65 0.73 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 6 Reliability of CBIG Indices 
This table presents the reliability test results of the CBIG indices. Two types of reliability tests are 
applied here: the test of stability (Test-retest) and the internal consistency (Cronbach alpha) are 
calculated by applying equation s 3 and 4 respectively.  
  
Testscore(1) is the first test score of CBIG index construction of 20 countries in 2005, Testscore(2) 
calculates the second test score of same index for same 20 countries in 2006.  Out of the total 26 
variables in the CBIG index only two variables (i legal power to appoint Governor/CEO and ii. 
Accountability of Governor/CEO) seemed to have slightly deviated from the original rating. The ratings 
of the reminder 24 were unchanged. The deviation was because that the Governor/CEO in some 
countries is directly appointed by the parliament while for few others the government appointment 
requires parliamentary approval. In 2005 the latter appointment process was considered as appointed by 
the government only but later (in 2006) both of them were considered as same. The reliability of CBIG 
overall index is measured by the following equations. 
 
             (3); 
 
 
 
 
Where, in equation (4), N = The number of items, ( )iY2σ∑ = The sum of item variance,  =The 
variance of the total composite. 
x2σ
The test-retest test was applied for CBIG sub-indices; and Cronbach alpha for CBIG (overall) index. In 
both cases found a high level of reliability. 
CBIG indices Testscore(1) 
(2005) 
Testscore(2) 
(2006) 
Reliability 
(Test-retest) (Cronbach  Alpha) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBIGLeg 5 4 0.80 - 
CBIGPol  3 3 1.00 - 
CBIGPStab 3 3 1.00 - 
CBIGForx 3 3 1.00 - 
CBIGMonPol 6 6 1.00 - 
CBIGAccTrns 6 5 0.83 - 
CBIGOverall 26 24 - 0.88 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 7 Relationship between CBIG and Inflation 
This table assesses the statistical relationship between inflation and CBIG by applying pooled (stacking data) in least square method in the following equation:  
 
 
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGitk + β2ASCRIS_Dummy 1997tk + β3SRI_Dummytk + β4MAL_Dummytk + β5M2PERGDPtk + β6REALINTRATEtk + εtk …………….(equations 1). 
 
 
Inflation (transformed, YD) is defined as the percentage change in the consumer price.  CBIGi is an index measuring central bank independence and governance by a overall index 
(CBIGOverall) and six sub-indices: legal (CBIGLeg); political (CBIGPol); price stability objectives (CBIGPStab); exchange rate policy (CBIGForx); monetary policy and deficit 
financing (CBIGMonPol); finally, accountability and transparency (CBIGAccTrns). These seven indices (one overall and six sub-indices) represent one main and six associated 
equations in the following table respectively. The control variables include Asian financial crisis in 1997 (ASCRIS1997) dummy (pre crisis period 1991 to 1997 = 0 and post crisis 
period 1998-2005 =1); Sri Lanka Dummy (SRI_Dummy) (Si Lanka  = 1, rest of the seven countries = 0); Maldives Dummy (MAL_Dummy) (Maldives  = 1, rest of the seven 
countries = 0);money supply  (M2PERGDP) is M2 money supply per GDP; and finally, real interest rate (REALINTRATE) is defined as the lending rate adjusted for inflation. The 
time period (t) and cross section (k) covered are 1991 to 2005 and total observations of 68. 
 
The main finding of equation 5 is a low significant positive relationship between inflation and CBIG. So it means an increase in CBIG (overall) contributes an increase in inflation, 
vice versa. Other findings include (equation xxxx) an increase in CBIG (Price stability objectives) and CBIG (Accountability and Transparency) also increases inflation, however the 
rest of the four sub-indices were found as insignificant.   
Variables  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Inflation (Dependent)  t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat 
Constant  3.270344*** 3.645115*** 3.916600*** 3.543807*** 3.094016*** 2.561316** 3.302796*** 
CBIG (Overall) index  1.967615*       
CBIG (Legal) Index   1.548083      
CBIG (Political) Index    1.581460     
CBIG (Price Stability Objectives) Index     1.937274*    
CBIG (Exchange Rate Policy) Index      1.199520   
CBIG (Monetary policy and Deficit Financing) Index       1.251337  
CBIG (Accountability and Transparency) Index        2.226558** 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997 Dummy  1.230090 1.043491 0.882128 1.282827 0.821534 0.870706 1.313794 
Sri Lanka Dummy  -1.511086 -0.671810 -0.783175 -0.638710 -1.212963 -1.212364 -1.777466* 
Maldives Dummy  2.128991** 1.929451* 1.941302* 1.959871* 1.722450* 1.980396* 1.944563* 
Money Supply   -1.802292* -1.495102 -1.455229 -1.737893* -1.567478 -1.588309 -2.003889* 
Real Interest Rate (%)  -0.144989 -0.783070 -0.739402 -0.624933 -0.231955 -0.171537 0.357597 
Adj. R2  0.208760 0.193839 0.183707 0.210079 0.184188 0.185532 0.213111 
F- Statistics  3.525312*** 3.301427*** 3.154054*** 3.545521*** 3.160961*** 3.180320*** 3.592210*** 
 “***”, “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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